Vor Ort
Merkzettel Warenkorb
Produktbild: Differential Information Economies
Band 19 - 10%

Differential Information Economies

Aus der Reihe Studies in Economic Theory
10% sparen

191,99 € UVP 213,99 €

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

21.10.2010

Herausgeber

Dionysius Glycopantis + weitere

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

650

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/3,7 cm

Gewicht

1008 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-05977-3

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

21.10.2010

Herausgeber

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

650

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/3,7 cm

Gewicht

1008 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of hardcover 1st ed. 2005

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-05977-3

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag GmbH
Tiergartenstr. 17
69121 Heidelberg
DE

Email: GPSR Kontakt

Noch keine Bewertungen vorhanden

Verfassen Sie die erste Bewertung zu diesem Artikel

Helfen Sie anderen Kundinnen und Kunden durch Ihre Meinung.

Kundinnen und Kunden meinen

Bewertungen (0)
  • Produktbild: Differential Information Economies
  • Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies.- Core Notions, Existence Results.- Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy.- Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper.- The core of an economy with differential information.- An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core.- On the continuity of expected utility.- Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core.- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw.- Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information.- Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence.- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information.- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies.- Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core.- Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility.- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information.- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies.- Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core.- Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm.- Optimal multilateral contracts.- Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry.- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans.- Incentive compatible contractible information.- Continuity and Stability.- Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete.- On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms.- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection.- Non-myopic learning in differential information economies: the core.- Value Allocations and the Bargaining SET.- Cooperative games with incomplete information.- The value allocation of an economy with differential information.- Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information.- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information.- Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?.- Implementation.- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies.- An extensive form interpretation of the private core.- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies.