Vor Ort
Merkzettel Warenkorb
Produktbild: Rationality Through Reasoning

Rationality Through Reasoning

Aus der Reihe The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy

51,99 €

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

26.08.2013

Verlag

John Wiley & Sons

Seitenzahl

322

Maße (L/B/H)

22,9/15,2/1,8 cm

Gewicht

424 g

Auflage

1. Auflage

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-118-65605-1

Beschreibung

Rezension

"Rationality Through Reasoning is clearly written, and it contains many discussions with other experts in this genre of analytic philosophy, such as Gilbert Harman, Niko Kolodny, and Derek Parfit, to whom the book is dedicated." ( Ethical Perspectives , 1 March 2014)

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

26.08.2013

Verlag

John Wiley & Sons

Seitenzahl

322

Maße (L/B/H)

22,9/15,2/1,8 cm

Gewicht

424 g

Auflage

1. Auflage

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-118-65605-1

Herstelleradresse

Produktsicherheitsverantwortliche/r
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

Kundinnen und Kunden meinen

0 Bewertungen

Informationen zu Bewertungen

Zur Abgabe einer Bewertung ist eine Anmeldung im Konto notwendig. Die Authentizität der Bewertungen wird von uns nicht überprüft. Wir behalten uns vor, Bewertungstexte, die unseren Richtlinien widersprechen, entsprechend zu kürzen oder zu löschen.

Die Bewertungen sind nach Format, Anzahl Sterne und Datum sortiert.

Verfassen Sie die erste Bewertung zu diesem Artikel

Helfen Sie anderen Kund*innen durch Ihre Meinung

Kundinnen und Kunden meinen

0 Bewertungen filtern
Die Leseprobe wird geladen.
  • Produktbild: Rationality Through Reasoning
  • Preface xi
     
    1 Introduction 1
     
    1.1 Motivation 1
     
    1.2 This book 4
     
    Notes 6
     
    2 Ought 8
     
    2.1 The meaning of 'ought' 8
     
    2.2 Normative and non-normative oughts 9
     
    2.3 Owned and unowned oughts 12
     
    2.4 Qualified and unqualified oughts 25
     
    Notes 29
     
    3 Objective, Subjective and Prospective Oughts 31
     
    3.1 Sidgwick's View 31
     
    3.2 The need to decide 34
     
    3.3 Objective and prospective oughts 36
     
    3.4 Valuing prospects 41
     
    3.5 Summary 45
     
    Notes 45
     
    4 Reasons 46
     
    4.1 Introduction and preliminaries 46
     
    4.2 Pro toto reasons 49
     
    4.3 Pro tanto reasons 51
     
    4.4 Most reason 62
     
    4.5 Ownership of reasons 65
     
    5 Responding to Reasons 71
     
    5.1 Rationality and responding to reasons 71
     
    5.2 The quick objection 74
     
    5.3 Attitudinal reasons 75
     
    5.4 Sufficiency of reasons 82
     
    Notes 87
     
    6 Responding to Reason-Beliefs 88
     
    6.1 The Enkratic Condition 88
     
    6.2 Meeting your own standards 91
     
    6.3 Responding correctly to P-beliefs 101
     
    6.4 Conclusion 107
     
    Notes 108
     
    7 Requirements 109
     
    7.1 Two sorts of requirement 109
     
    7.2 Property requirements 110
     
    7.3 Source requirements 116
     
    7.4 Logic for requirements? 119
     
    7.5 Ought 126
     
    Notes 129
     
    8 Conditional Requirements 132
     
    8.1 Application and content 132
     
    8.2 Conditional requirements of rationality 134
     
    Notes 146
     
    Appendix to Chapter 8 148
     
    9 Synchronic Rationality 149
     
    9.1 Introduction and method 149
     
    9.2 Consistency 154
     
    9.3 Deduction 157
     
    9.4 Instrumental Rationality 159
     
    9.5 Enkrasia 170
     
    9.6 Bayesian requirements 175
     
    Notes 175
     
    10 Diachronic Rationality 177
     
    10.1 Persistence of Intention 177
     
    10.2 The rationality of doing as you decide 181
     
    10.3 Diachronic requirements on beliefs 185
     
    Notes 69
     
    10.4 Basing prohibitions and basing permissions 186
     
    Notes 191
     
    11 Rationality and Normativity 192
     
    11.1 The Normative Question 192
     
    11.2 More on rationality and reasons 193
     
    11.3 Is rationality derivatively normative? 197
     
    11.4 Is rationality non-derivatively normative? 204
     
    Notes 205
     
    12 Higher-Order Reasoning 206
     
    12.1 The reasoning process 206
     
    12.2 Reasoning through an intention 210
     
    12.3 Reasoning with judgement-sensitive attitudes 216
     
    12.4 One more point 219
     
    Notes 220
     
    13 First-Order Reasoning 221
     
    13.1 The reasoning process 221
     
    13.2 Necessary and sufficient conditions for reasoning 225
     
    13.3 Operating on contents 231
     
    13.4 Reasoning as activity 235
     
    13.5 Reasoning at the first order 242
     
    13.6 The direction of reasoning 243
     
    13.7 Correct belief reasoning 246
     
    Notes 248
     
    14 Practical Reasoning 250
     
    14.1 Reasoning with attitudes other than beliefs 250
     
    14.2 Correctness 255
     
    14.3 Choosing a means 261
     
    14.4 Hypothesizing 264
     
    Notes 265
     
    15 Explicit Reasoning 267
     
    15.1 Markers 267
     
    15.2 Bayesian and expressivist reasoning 275
     
    15.3 Reasoning with absences 278
     
    15.4 Theoretical and practical reasoning 281
     
    15.5 Intention reasoning with other markers 285
     
    Notes 286
     
    16 Enkratic Reasoning