Produktbild: Voting Procedures under Uncertainty

Voting Procedures under Uncertainty

98,99 €

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

21.07.2012

Abbildungen

X, 1 illus., schwarz-weiss Illustrationen

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

156

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/1 cm

Gewicht

265 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2002

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-53500-0

Beschreibung

Rezension

From the reviews:



"The main objective of Voting Procedures under Uncertainty is to clarify how uncertainty pertains to the performance of voting procedures. This significant task is successfully undertaken … . this book is a useful, refreshing and challenging reading for students and researchers of collective decision making." (S. Nitzan, Journal of Economics, Vol. 80 (3), 2003)


"For the person interested in a ‘reader friendly’ introduction to the mathematics of voting theory, an outline of some of the more recent contributions to this area, or a reference book with references to the main results, I highly recommend Nurmi’s book." (Donald G. Saari, Mathematical Reviews, 2004 d)


"The author considers the impact of various types of uncertainty on social choice theory, and especially voting theory. … The explanations are clear and accompanied by either simple theoretical examples or ones drawn from recent political experience. The book contains a wealth of information for the interested reader." (Duncan J. Melville, Zentralblatt MATH, Vol. 1018, 2003)

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

21.07.2012

Abbildungen

X, 1 illus., schwarz-weiss Illustrationen

Verlag

Springer Berlin

Seitenzahl

156

Maße (L/B/H)

23,5/15,5/1 cm

Gewicht

265 g

Auflage

Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2002

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-3-642-53500-0

Herstelleradresse

Springer-Verlag KG
Sachsenplatz 4-6
1201 Wien
AT

Email: GPSR Kontakt

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  • Produktbild: Voting Procedures under Uncertainty
  • 1. Choice Theory and Constitutional Design.- 1.1 Theories and Models.- 1.2 Applying Social Choice Theory.- 1.3 Varying Assumptions.- 2. Chaotic Behavior of Models.- 2.1 The U.S. Presidential Elections.- 2.2 Referendum Paradox and the Properties of Majority Rule.- 2.3 How Chaotic Can It Get?.- 3. Results Based on Standard Model.- 3.1 Voting Procedures.- 3.2 Performance Criteria.- 3.3 Chaos, Strategy and Self Correction.- 4. Aggregating Voting Probabilities and Judgments.- 4.1 Avoiding Arrow’s Theorem via Average Rule.- 4.2 Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.- 4.3 Relaxing the Independence Assumption.- 4.4 Optimal Jury Decision Making.- 4.5 Thought Experiment: Council of Ministers as a Jury.- 5. Condorcet’s Rule and Preference Proximity.- 5.1 Condorcet’s Rule.- 5.2 Measuring Preference Similarity.- 5.3 Preference Proximity and Other Desiderata.- 5.4 Ranking and Choice Rules.- 5.5 Kemeny, Dodgson and Slater.- 6. Responses to Changes in Voter Opinions.- 6.1 Monotonicity, Maskin-Monotonicity and No-Show Paradox 92.- 6.2 The Strong No-Show Paradox.- 6.3 Qualified Majorities and No-Show Paradox.- 6.4 Monotonicity Violations of Voting Systems.- 6.5 Preference Truncation Paradox.- 6.6 Preference Misrepresentation.- 7. Mos Docendi Geometricus.- 7.1 The British Parliamentary Elections of 2001.- 7.2 Critique of Condorcet’s Intuition.- 7.3 Profile Decomposition.- 7.4 Berlin vs. Bonn Vote Revisited.- 8. Conclusions.- List of Figures 139 List of Tables.- Author Index.