Produktbild: Assured Cloud Computing

Assured Cloud Computing

168,99 €

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei


Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

02.10.2018

Herausgeber

Roy H. Campbell + weitere

Verlag

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Seitenzahl

368

Maße (L/B/H)

23,6/15,1/2,5 cm

Gewicht

704 g

Auflage

1. Auflage

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-119-42863-3

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

02.10.2018

Herausgeber

Verlag

John Wiley & Sons Inc

Seitenzahl

368

Maße (L/B/H)

23,6/15,1/2,5 cm

Gewicht

704 g

Auflage

1. Auflage

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-1-119-42863-3

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

Noch keine Bewertungen vorhanden

Verfassen Sie die erste Bewertung zu diesem Artikel

Helfen Sie anderen Kundinnen und Kunden durch Ihre Meinung.

Kundinnen und Kunden meinen

Bewertungen (0)

Die Leseprobe wird geladen.
  • Produktbild: Assured Cloud Computing
  • Preface xiii
     
    Editors' Biographies xvii
     
    List of Contributors xix
     
    1 Introduction 1
    Roy H. Campbell
     
    1.1 Introduction 1
     
    1.1.1 Mission-Critical Cloud Solutions for the Military 2
     
    1.2 Overview of the Book 3
     
    2 Survivability: Design, Formal Modeling, and Validation of Cloud Storage Systems Using Maude 10
    Rakesh Bobba, Jon Grov, Indranil Gupta, Si Liu, José Meseguer,Peter Csaba Ölveczky, and Stephen Skeirik
     
    2.1 Introduction 10
     
    2.1.1 State of the Art 11
     
    2.1.2 Vision: Formal Methods for Cloud Storage Systems 12
     
    2.1.3 The Rewriting Logic Framework 13
     
    2.1.4 Summary: Using Formal Methods on Cloud Storage Systems 15
     
    2.2 Apache Cassandra 17
     
    2.3 Formalizing, Analyzing, and Extending Google's Megastore 23
     
    2.3.1 Specifying Megastore 23
     
    2.3.2 Analyzing Megastore 25
     
    2.3.2.1 Megastore-CGC 29
     
    2.4 RAMP Transaction Systems 30
     
    2.5 Group Key Management via ZooKeeper 31
     
    2.5.1 ZooKeeper Background 32
     
    2.5.2 System Design 33
     
    2.5.3 Maude Model 34
     
    2.5.4 Analysis and Discussion 35
     
    2.6 How Amazon Web Services Uses Formal Methods 37
     
    2.6.1 Use of Formal Methods 37
     
    2.6.2 Outcomes and Experiences 38
     
    2.6.3 Limitations 39
     
    2.7 Related Work 40
     
    2.8 Concluding Remarks 42
     
    2.8.1 The Future 43
     
    3 Risks and Benefits: Game-Theoretical Analysis and Algorithm for Virtual Machine Security Management in the Cloud 49
    Luke Kwiat, Charles A. Kamhoua, Kevin A. Kwiat, and Jian Tang
     
    3.1 Introduction 49
     
    3.2 Vision: Using Cloud Technology in Missions 51
     
    3.3 State of the Art 54
     
    3.4 System Model 57
     
    3.5 Game Model 59
     
    3.6 Game Analysis 61
     
    3.7 Model Extension and Discussion 67
     
    3.8 Numerical Results and Analysis 71
     
    3.8.1 Changes in User 2's Payoff with Respect to L2 71
     
    3.8.2 Changes in User 2's Payoff with Respect to e 72
     
    3.8.3 Changes in User 2's Payoff with Respect to pi 73
     
    3.8.4 Changes in User 2's Payoff with Respect to qI 74
     
    3.8.5 Model Extension to n = 10 Users 75
     
    3.9 The Future 78
     
    4 Detection and Security: Achieving Resiliency by Dynamic and Passive System Monitoring and Smart Access Control 81
    Zbigniew Kalbarczyk
     
    4.1 Introduction 82
     
    4.2 Vision: Using Cloud Technology in Missions 83
     
    4.3 State of the Art 84
     
    4.4 Dynamic VM Monitoring Using Hypervisor Probes 85
     
    4.4.1 Design 86
     
    4.4.2 Prototype Implementation 88
     
    4.4.3 Example Detectors 90
     
    4.4.3.1 Emergency Exploit Detector 90
     
    4.4.3.2 Application Heartbeat Detector 91
     
    4.4.4 Performance 93
     
    4.4.4.1 Microbenchmarks 93
     
    4.4.4.2 Detector Performance 94
     
    4.4.5 Summary 95
     
    4.5 Hypervisor Introspection: A Technique for Evading Passive Virtual Machine Monitoring 96
     
    4.5.1 Hypervisor Introspection 97
     
    4.5.1.1 VMI Monitor 97
     
    4.5.1.2 VM Suspend Side-Channel 97
     
    4.5.1.3 Limitations of Hypervisor Introspection 98
     
    4.5.2 Evading VMI with Hypervisor Introspection 98
     
    4.5.2.1 Insider Attack Model and Assumptions 98
     
    4.5.2.2 Large File Transfer 99
     
    4.5.3 Defenses against Hypervisor Introspection 101
     
    4.5.3.1 Introducing Noise to VM Clocks 101
     
    4.5.3.2 Scheduler-Based Defenses 101
     
    4.5.3.3 Randomized Monitoring Interval 102
     
    4.5.4 Summary 103
     
    4.6 Identifying Compromised Users in Shared Computing Infrastructures 103
     
    4.6.1