• Produktbild: Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization
  • Produktbild: Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization

Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization How Shareholders gained Control Rights in Britain, Germany, and France

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

01.03.2018

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

182

Maße (L/B/H)

22,2/14,5/1,4 cm

Gewicht

364 g

Sprache

Englisch, Französisch

ISBN

978-0-19-881502-0

Beschreibung

Rezension

Regulating the markets in which struggles over corporate control take place is deeply political, but in ways that defy political tramlines. Helen Callaghan here carefully and revealingly unpicks the complex alliances and conflicts of interest that have determined changes on this issue. In so doing she also throws important new light on general debates about the nature of markets, varieties of capitalism, and processes of policy change. Colin Crouch, Professor emeritus, University of Warwick, and External scientific member, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

01.03.2018

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

182

Maße (L/B/H)

22,2/14,5/1,4 cm

Gewicht

364 g

Sprache

Englisch, Französisch

ISBN

978-0-19-881502-0

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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  • Produktbild: Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization
  • Produktbild: Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization
    • Contents

    • Abbreviations

    • Acknowledgements

    • 1: Introduction

    • 1.1: The Puzzle: Market Liberalization Across Advanced Capitalist Democracies

    • 1.2: Analytic Focus: Policy Feedback Processes

    • 1.3: The Argument

    • 1.4: Research Operationalization

    • 1.5: Case Selection

    • 1.6: Epistemology, Ontology, and Method

    • 1.7: Outline

    • 2: The Political Dynamics of Marketizing Corporate Control

    • 2.1: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Regulatory Challenge

    • 2.2: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Political Process

    • 2.3: Economic Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Control

    • 2.4: Economic Dynamism and Political Salience

    • 2.5: Summary

    • 3: Britain

    • 3.1: The Prewar and Interwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids

    • Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?

    • 3.2: Turning Point after the Second World War: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids

    • Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?

    • 3.3: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules

    • Puzzle 3: Why did pro-market groups prevail?

    • 3.4: Summary

    • 4.: Germany

    • 4.1: The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids

    • 4.2: Turning Point in the 1990s: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids

    • Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?

    • Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?

    • 4.3: Summary

    • 5: France

    • 5.1: Prewar, Interwar and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids

    • Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?

    • 5.2: First Turning Point After the Second World War: State Supervision of Incumbents

    • 5.3: Second Turning Point in the late 1960s: Steps Toward Marketization

    • Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?

    • 5.4: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules

    • 5.5: Summary

    • 6: Conclusion

    • 6.1: Findings

    • 6.2: Generalizability

    • 6.3: Alternative Explanations

    • 6.4: Value Added to Previous Research in the Same Empirical Domain

    • 6.5: Broader Theoretical Significance

    • Bibliography