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Produktbild: Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

Seeing, Knowing, and Doing A Perceptualist Account

29,99 €

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Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

18.04.2025

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

244

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,7/2,3 cm

Gewicht

363 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-780234-2

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Taschenbuch

Erscheinungsdatum

18.04.2025

Verlag

Oxford University Press

Seitenzahl

244

Maße (L/B/H)

23,4/15,7/2,3 cm

Gewicht

363 g

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-19-780234-2

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: gpsr@libri.de

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  • Produktbild: Seeing, Knowing, and Doing

    • Preface
    • Acknowledgments
    • Introduction
    • Part One: Perception
    • Chapter 1 Perception and Perceptual Belief: Seeing and Knowing the Physical World
    • I. Perception Broadly Conceived
    • II. Four Structurally Distinct Cases of Perception
    • III. The Representational Character of Perception
    • Chapter 2 Dimensions of Perceptual Content
    • I. Three Categories of Perceptual Content
    • II. Singular Reference and the Possible Role of Russellian Propositions
    • III. Perception and Belief: Cognitive and Conceptual Aspects
    • Chapter 3 Perceptual Levels and their Action-Theoretic Counterparts
    • I. Perception and Action: The Structural Analogy
    • II. Constitutive Elements in the Visual Perception of Physical Objects
    • III. Awareness of Events and Abstract Entities
    • IV. The Epistemological Significance of Perceptual Levels
    • V. Is Perception Theory-Laden?
    • VI. The Importance of "Background Beliefs" and Perceptual Levels
    • VII. Aspectual Perception, Inference, and Recognition
    • Chapter 4 Perception as a Source of Knowledge and Justification
    • I. Perceptual Knowledge
    • II. The Hierarchical Character of Perception
    • III. Perceptual Justification: External and Internal Dimensions
    • IV. The Perceptibility of Normative Properties
    • Chapter 5 Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation
    • I. The Diversity of Reasons for Belief
    • II. Reasons as Distinguished from Grounds
    • III. Reasons and Grounds for Belief: The Practical Analogy
    • IV. Reasons as Explanations
    • V. Normative Reasons and their Grounds
    • Chapter 6 The Autonomy of Justification
    • I. Epistemological Internalism
    • II. Does Knowledge Entail Justification?
    • III. The Practice-Relativity of Justification
    • IV. An Integrated View of Knowledge and Justification
    • V. The Disjunctivist Challenge
    • VI. The Elusive Notion of the Content of Perceptual Belief
    • VII. Perception and Singular Reference
    • Part Two: Perception and the A Priori
    • Chapter 7 Perception, Intuition, and Apprehension
    • I. Perception and Intuition
    • II. Structural Parallels between Intuitional and Perceptional Discourse
    • III. Intuitions as Evidential Cognitions: Two Intuitionist Traditions
    • IV. Intuitions as Apprehensions
    • Chapter 8 Toward a Theory of the A Priori
    • I. The Concept of Self-Evidence
    • II. Understanding as Central for Knowledge of the Self-evident
    • III. Understanding and Imagination
    • IV. Major Elements in the Understanding of Propositions
    • V. Degrees of Understanding and Propositional Justification
    • VI. Comprehensional Adequacy
    • VII. Obstacles to Comprehension
    • Chapter 9 Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity
    • I. Self-Evidence and Provability
    • II. Can Rational Disagreement Extend to the Self-Evident?
    • III. The Self-Evident, the Obvious, and the Credible
    • IV. Apprehension of Abstract Entities
    • V. Apriority and Necessity
    • Part Three: Practical Knowledge
    • Chapter 10 Knowledge, Belief, and Action
    • I. Belief and Action
    • II. Two Orders of Cognitive Disposition
    • III. Belief and Knowledge, Intention and Action
    • Chapter 11 Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing
    • I. Intellectualism as a Perspective on Action
    • II. Practical Knowledge and Knowledge of the Practical
    • III. Virtual Knowledge: A Neglected Category
    • IV. The Place of Knowledge in Practical Reasoning
    • Chapter 12 Inference and Its Role in Rational Action
    • I. Inference and Inferential Belief
    • II. Inference, Reasoning, and Premise-Based Belief-Formation
    • III. Reasoning and Rational Action
    • IV. The Scope of Rational Action
    • V. Intentionality, Knowledge, and Agency
    • Conclusion: Perception, Apprehension, and Action
    • References
    • Index