Vor Ort
Merkzettel Warenkorb
Produktbild: Social Influence and the Logic of Collective Action
Vorbesteller Neu

Social Influence and the Logic of Collective Action

138,99 €

inkl. gesetzl. MwSt., Versandkostenfrei

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

28.07.2026

Verlag

Princeton University Press

Seitenzahl

400

Maße (L/B)

23,5/15,6 cm

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-691-27595-6

Beschreibung

Produktdetails

Einband

Gebundene Ausgabe

Erscheinungsdatum

28.07.2026

Verlag

Princeton University Press

Seitenzahl

400

Maße (L/B)

23,5/15,6 cm

Sprache

Englisch

ISBN

978-0-691-27595-6

Herstelleradresse

Libri GmbH
Europaallee 1
36244 Bad Hersfeld
DE

Email: GPSR Kontakt

Noch keine Bewertungen vorhanden

Verfassen Sie die erste Bewertung zu diesem Artikel

Helfen Sie anderen Kundinnen und Kunden durch Ihre Meinung.

Kundinnen und Kunden meinen

Bewertungen (0)
Die Leseprobe wird geladen.
  • Produktbild: Social Influence and the Logic of Collective Action

    • Preface
    • Acknowledgments
    • Common Mathematical Symbols
    • 1 Human Behavior in Collective Action
      • 1.1 Objectives, Outcomes, and Obstacles in Collective Action
      • 1.2 Biological Roots of Human Sociality
      • 1.3 Forces Involved in Collective Action
        • 1.3.1 Human Motivation
        • 1.3.2 Material Costs and Benefits
        • 1.3.3 Attitudes, Personal Norms, and Morality
        • 1.3.4 Social Influence
        • 1.3.5 Cognitive Processes
        • 1.3.6 Beliefs and Belief Dynamics
        • 1.3.7 Between-Individual Differences
      • 1.4 Building a Theory of Collective Action
        • 1.4.1 Philosophical Inquiry into Collective Action
        • 1.4.2 Classical Game Theory
        • 1.4.3 Evolutionary Game Theory
        • 1.4.4 Behavioral Economics
        • 1.4.5 Gaps in Collective Action Theory
      • 1.5 A Need for a Unified Model of Collective Action
      • 1.6 Book Structure
      • 2 Collective Action in Classical and Evolutionary Game Theories
        • 2.1 Social Dilemmas and Nash Equilibria
          • 2.1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
          • 2.1.2 Volunteer’s Dilemma
          • 2.1.3 Linear Public Goods Game
        • 2.2 Mancur Olson’s “The Logic of Collective Action” (1965)
        • 2.3 Evolutionary Game Theory
        • 2.4 Collective Action Problems
          • 2.4.1 Public Goods Production
          • 2.4.2 Resource Exploitation
          • 2.4.3 Collective Risk Avoidance
        • 2.5 Between-Group Conflicts
        • 2.6 Effects of Between-Individual Differences
        • 2.7 Coordination Within Groups
        • 2.8 Factors Maintaining Cooperation
          • 2.8.1 Real-Life and Behavioral Experiments
          • 2.8.2 Punishment
          • 2.8.3 Extending Theory
        • 2.9 Summary and Conclusions
        • 3 Evolutionary Emergence of Social Influence
          • 3.1 Population Genetic Modeling
          • 3.2 Unbiased Social Learning
            • 3.2.1 Infinite State ¿-Cycle Environment
            • 3.2.2 Two-State ¿-Cycle Environment
            • 3.2.3 Infinite-State Random Environment
            • 3.2.4 Competition of Types Relying on Innate, Individually Learned, and Socially Learned Behaviors
          • 3.3 Biased Social Learning
            • 3.3.1 Conformist Bias in Learning
            • 3.3.2 Payoff Bias in Learning
          • 3.4 Evolution of Personal Norms and Social Norm Internalization
            • 3.4.1 Socialization
            • 3.4.2 Assortment and Kantian Preferences
            • 3.4.3 The Evolution of Personal Standards Into Social Norms
            • 3.4.4 Inculcation
            • 3.4.5 Personal Norms and Conformity
          • 3.5 Summary and Conclusions
          • 4 Dynamics of Social Influence
            • 4.1 Discrete Opinion Space
              • 4.1.1 Culture as an Infection
              • 4.1.2 Complex Contagions
              • 4.1.3 Population Genetics-Type Models
            • 4.2 Continuous Opinion Space
              • 4.2.1 DeGroot Model
              • 4.2.2 Heterogeneity in Personality Traits
              • 4.2.3 Heterogeneity in Social Partners
              • 4.2.4 Effects of Homophily, Repulsion, and Biased Assimilation
              • 4.2.5 Authorities and Hubs
              • 4.2.6 The Dynamics of Social Power
              • 4.2.7 Effects of Latent Preferences and Authority
              • 4.2.8 Multi-Dimensional Opinions and Logic Constraints
              • 4.2.9 Utility Functions and Stochasticity
            • 4.3 Summary and Conclusions
            • 5 Dynamics of Behavior with Social Influence and Stable Personal Norms
              • 5.1 Rashevsky Model
              • 5.2 Schelling–Granovetter Model
              • 5.3 Dynamic Norms
              • 5.4 Norm-Utility Approach
                • 5.4.1 Spread of Social Unrest
                • 5.4.2 Tipping at Restaurants
                • 5.4.3 Academic Journal Review Process
                • 5.4.4 Linear Public Goods Game
                • 5.4.5 Sanctioning in Culturally Tight and Loose Societies
                • 5.4.6 Breaking Injunctive Social Norms
                • 5.4.7 Norms and Metanorms in a Collective Action
                • 5.4.8 Culture Wars
              • 5.5 Summary and Conclusions
              • 6 Dynamics of Behavior with Social Influence and Evolving Personal Norms
                • 6.1 Immoral Behavior and Cognitive Dissonance
                  • 6.1.1 Rational Choice Approach
                  • 6.1.2 Coevolution of Actions and Beliefs
                • 6.2 The Granovetter Model with Evolving Thresholds
                • 6.3 Cultural Integration
                  • 6.3.1 Cultural Integration in Partially Segregated Populations
                  • 6.3.2 Cultural Integration and Polarization on Networks
                • 6.4 Linear Public Goods Game
                • 6.5 Collective Behavior in Heterogeneous Groups
                • 6.6 Political Polarization
                • 6.7 Effects of Inculcation and Propaganda
                  • 6.7.1 Food-Sharing in Small-Scale Societies
                  • 6.7.2 Political Protests
                • 6.8 Summary and Conclusions
                • 7 Coevolution of Actions, Attitudes, and Beliefs About Others
                  • 7.1 The Integrative Model
                    • 7.1.1 Dynamics and Equilibria
                    • 7.1.2 Generalization and Implications
                  • 7.2 Pluralistic Ignorance, Spirals of Silence, Preference Falsification, and Cultural Evolutionary Mismatch
                    • 7.2.1 Model
                    • 7.2.2 Parameters and Initial Conditions
                    • 7.2.3 Model Predictions and Their Interpretation
                  • 7.3 Differences Between the Two Approaches
                  • 7.4 Summary and Conclusions
                  • 8 Testing and Validating the Integrative Model in Behavioral Experiments
                    • 8.1 Experimental Approach
                    • 8.2 Estimation
                    • 8.3 Results
                      • 8.3.1 Common Pool Resource Experiments
                      • 8.3.2 Collective Risk Experiments
                      • 8.3.3 Comparison of the CPR and CR Experiments
                    • 8.4 Summary and Conclusions
                    • 9 Modeling Online Behavior
                      • 9.1 Online Actions, Beliefs, Payoffs, and Social Influence
                      • 9.2 Epidemiological Models
                      • 9.3 User Behavior and Content Interaction
                      • 9.4 Temporal Dynamics and Social Influence
                      • 9.5 Vaccination and Opinion Formation
                      • 9.6 Effects of Feedback
                      • 9.7 Political Polarization
                      • 9.8 Spirals of Silence
                      • 9.9 Battle for the Minds
                      • 9.10 Summary and Conclusions
                    • 10 Synthesis
                      • 10.1 Theoretical Insights and Their Implications
                        • 10.1.1 Social Influence
                        • 10.1.2 Relative Weights of Different Factors
                        • 10.1.3 Cognitive Processes
                        • 10.1.4 Individual Differences
                        • 10.1.5 Social Network Structure
                        • 10.1.6 Personal and Social Norms
                        • 10.1.7 Some Fascinating Manifestations of Collective Beliefs and Behaviors
                        • 10.1.8 Cultural Tightness-Looseness
                        • 10.1.9 Cooperation
                        • 10.1.10 Online Behavior
                      • 10.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation
                      • 10.3 Policy and Practical Applications
                        • 10.3.1 Connections with Behavior Change Theories
                        • 10.3.2 Fostering Behavioral Change and Collective Action
                      • Bibliography
                      • Index